Heidegger, and Wittgenstein: From Anti-Skepticism to 'Being-In'

Abstract

In this paper, it is showed that affinities between Wittgenstein and Heidegger are not restricted merely to epistemological and/or methodological ones; but there are also ontological similarities between them. Not only non-Cartesian, their ontological common grounds are also against the skepticism which goes hand in hand with Cartesianism. They both do regard the skeptical problems of “external world” and “other minds” as pseudo problems that must be dissolved instead of being solved. So construed, Cartesianism is as meaningless as its offspring, skepticism, for both of them. This criticism against an old tradition can be generally seen throughout Philosophical Investigations and Being and Time. On the one hand, Wittgenstein attacks to tradition by his rejection of the “private language of sensation” as well as his defence of the ontological grounds of the linguistic community ( whether or not any actual community member exist.) On the other hand, Heidegger destructs the Cartesian framework based on the impossibility of “Intentionality” and “transcendence” in a Cartesian world.