Heidegger and Kant

Abstract

There is a privileged relationship, even an acknowledged proximity, between Kant and Heidegger. Heidegger often recognized this, a fact which is all more striking view of his otherwise more critical treatment of great figures of tradition. What, exactly, are extent and limits of this proximity? What does it consist in? What light can it shed, not only on Heidegger's project as a fundamental ontology, but on Kant's transcendental idealism? These are main questions that would like to pursue this essay. will proceed by focusing on motif of idealism, and how it operates between two thinkers: how, on one hand, Heidegger was able to see and locate his own project of a fundamental ontology Kant's transcendental idealism, and how, on other hand, some of Kant's propositions could be said to anticipate fundamental ontology, thereby exceeding constraints of his own transcendental idealism. By stressing their remarkable proximity with respect to transcendental idealism, shall not be attempting to deny unquestionable differences between these two thinker's projects. But believe that these differences can be brought all more into relief and better understood if one begins by taking into account what two projects have common. It is a fact that Being and Time, Heidegger reads Kant a highly positive light. Unlike Descartes, who is severely criticized for having conceived of sum inappropriately (that is, by misunderstanding it as res and substance and not investigating subject's mode of Being), Kant is said to have made progress on path towards an ontology of Dasein. While Descartes is harshly judged for having remained (at best) dependent upon ancient and medieval ontology and for being unable to bring to light Dasein's phenomenal content, Kant is credited with genuine phenomenological insight. Each time that Heidegger mentions Kant Sein und Zeit, he does so order to bring out latter's positive and distinctive contribution: 1 ) In (section)6, a section which explains task of a destruction of history of ontology, Kant is said, essential respects, to have gone beyond Descartes' position (GA 2, 24), and to be the first and only person (GA 2, 23) to have approached problematic of Temporality philosophical elaboration of subjectivity. 2) In 43a, Heidegger sees Kant's critique of the problematical kind of idealism (in The Refutation of Idealism) a sign of Kant's rejection of the Cartesian approach of positing a one can come across isolation and considers Kant's presupposition of distinction (but also connection) between in me and outside of me to be factically correct (GA 2, 204). 3) In 64, Kant's analysis of I think is judged to be positive two respects: on one hand, it refuses, against Descartes, to make into a substance; on other hand, it defines that essentially as an I think, that is, as an that does not persist or subsist behind its thoughts (as would a substantial, isolated subject) but rather remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them.2 On three occasions, then, and each time at a decisive moment Sein und Zeit (first, when question of deconstruction of tradition arises; second, when metaphysical concept of reality is referred back to phenomenological concept of world; and lastly, question of ontological constitution of subject), Kant is favorably presented as site of a phenomenological breakthrough that is unique tradition, one that is important to follow up on and to clarify, insofar as it represents nothing less than anticipation of ontology of subject called for by Heidegger. One of main reasons for privileging Kant this way comes undoubtedly from Heidegger's conviction that Kant has overcome inadequate Cartesian framework, which treats problem of subjectivity exclusively within horizon of mode of Being of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). …