Abstract

Keywords Transboundary rivers Hegemony Asymmetry Two-level games Hydropolitics1 IntroductionWater connects, and transboundary rivers connect a host of actors in different states inmultiple ways. Riparian states can depend on each other for sea access, generating jointbenefits and minimising the losses from natural hazards. Yet, riparians can also use theriver to annoy, threaten, and damage each other by discharging wastewater into the basin orconstructing sufficient dams to store and regulate the river’s flow (Zawahri 2008). In anincreasingly interdependent world, we would expect a growing number of transboundaryriver treaties as states attempt to minimise the social, economic, and political lossesincurred from developing the basin and preventing unwelcome unilateral action. Suchattempts at cooperation may also lead to more integrated river basin management.Yet even when international water agreements are signed, it does not mean contractingstates are actually cooperating, and the lack of agreement does not mean riparian states arefighting. In other words, the presence of a treaty does not automatically translate intobehavioural altering cooperation. In the Iberian Peninsula and on the Mekong basin, forexample, relations remain conflictive despite some form of institutionalised cooperation.Thus, conflict and cooperation are ambiguous terms that tend to be used to describe howstates interact over their shared water resources. The objective of this special issue is totease out the dynamics of basin conflict and cooperation where power relations areasymmetric.

Highlights

  • Water connects, and transboundary rivers connect a host of actors in different states in multiple ways

  • After an examination of the function of hegemony within the basin, we introduce Putnam’s two-level games and some proposals for modification in the literature

  • Incident—a formal Belgian complaint to the Dutch government—which shows that sovereignty issues always lurk around the corner even when the decision-making process is ostentatively organised as a collaborative learning process. This special issue considers the role of hegemony in achieving cooperation in two- or multi-level hydro-political settings and games

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Summary

Introduction

Transboundary rivers connect a host of actors in different states in multiple ways. Non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), epistemic communities, and policy entrepreneurs, can enter the game and influence the outcome even under conditions of power asymmetry among the riparian states This special section seeks to advance our understanding of the interaction between domestic and international politics along with the role of non-state actors by considering several bordercrossing international rivers that are seen as sites of conflict or weak cooperation, such as the Euphrates and Tigris, Ganges, Mekong, and Iberian basins. 2 ‘(H)ydro-hegemony usually describes hegemonic interaction over transboundary water resources in river basins shared by two or more nations; it can be utilised for the exertion of power and control within a state as well’ (Wegerich and Warner 2010: 254). These riparians met secretly to manage the basin, while they lacked formal diplomatic relations (Sosland 2007; Zawahri 2010)

Revisiting hydro-hegemony
Putnam’s two-level games
Power strategies in the domestic-level game
Three-level games
Boundary spanning
Conclusion
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