Hegel's View of Moral Conscience and Kierkegaard's Interpretation of Abraham

Abstract

As has been noted previously, Fear and Trembling appeared together with Repetition and Three Edifying Discourses on October 16, 1843. It contains some of Kierkegaard's best-known concepts, such as the knight of faith, the paradox, the leap, and the absurd. Here Kierkegaard under the pseudonym, Johannes de silentio, gives his rich analysis of the Abraham and Isaac story to illustrate these and other concepts. In a series of three “Problemata,” he discusses the conundrums raised in the story by Abraham's reaction to the divine command to sacrifice his only son. The first “Problema” treats what is referred to as “the teleological suspension of the ethical.” Here the claim is set forth that the usual ethical duties and obligations can be “suspended” by a divine command. In the second “Problema,” Johannes de silentio argues that there is an absolute duty towards God which renders one's other duties finite and relative. Finally, in the third “Problema,” the problem of communication is discussed; given the private nature of the divine command, it was, according to Johannes de silentio, impossible for Abraham to explain his actions to others. Hegel's role in this text is significant. Although Kierkegaard usually has his pseudonyms employ expressions such as “a Hegelian,” or “recent philosophy,” Johannes de silentio uncharacteristically refers to Hegel directly in several passages. His anti-Hegel polemics were noted by two anonymous contemporary reviewers of Fear and Trembling .