Hegels Lehre vom Menschen. Kommentar zu den 387-482 der "Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften" (review)

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS 357 Hegel's analysis of the speculative sentence that provides the basis for the dialectical mode of explication he employed in the system itself, and it is the latter that constitutes his particular contribution to the enterprise of metaphysical reflection. In his essay "Les trois lectures philosophiques de rEncyclopedie ou la realisation du concept de philosophie chez Hegel," Theodore F. Geraets discusses a new interpretation of the three syllogisms of the concept of philosophy, as developed in Hegel's Enzyklopi~die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. He attacks as an impermissible oversimplification the interpretation of several eminent scholars--including G. Lasson, and J. van der Meulen--according to which the Enzykloptidie represents the first syllogism; the Phenomenology of Spirit, the second; and the Berlin lectures, especially those on the philosophy of religion, the third. In recent times, the Enzyklopi~die has been considered by several commentators as the third syllogism. Emil Fackenheim concludes that there is a triple mediation spread throughout Hegel's works; but Hegel seems to have given a complete systematic description of the third phase only, and this precisely in the Enzyklopi~die. This interpretation does not satisfy Geraets; nor does another, more detailed one, offered by A. Leonard. The basic content of Geraets's interpretation is developed as follows: The three syllogisms seem to express the three possible and required readings of the Enzyklopadie itself. They don't reveal anything new, but are not limited simply to resuming and repeating what was said before: they show that a unique reading cannot fully come to grips with the contents of science--not even the third reading. In fact, the third stands for itself even less than the first or second. The two preceding readings are in no way provisional, whereas the third one cannot represent anything but the comprehension of the two first readings in their unity. This is clearly expres'sed in the edition of 1830. To this reviewer, however, the whole complicated discussion does not appear overly relevant: it remains bogged down in the purely philological area. The last original essay in this volume is devoted to the problem of Hegel's conception of space. Dieter Wandschneider ("Raumliche Extension und das Problem der Dreidimensionalit ~t in Hegels Theorie des Raumes") tries to explain the dialectic method for the philosophy of natural science, a hitherto neglected field. He concludes that when Hegel talks of a three-dimensional space the number "three" has only an abstract significance and has no evidence for and in itself. One cannot see why just this number should be relevant for space. The three dimensions are nothing but three general differences. The determination of the number appears as an external factor having the form of accidentalness. Seen in such a way, the dimensions are "but directions which prove to be different, but not their unity or totality" (see "Jena Logic" and "Real Philosophy"). This opens the possibility of an abstract mathematical space which is not restricted to three dimensions. It represents but the most elementary and most original version of the principle of space. The fact that we cannot actually perceive more than three dimensions means only that even higher dimensional diversities cannot void the fact of the elementary space, because they presuppose it as their principle. Thus, Wandschneider has shown that Hegel's philosophy can be valid even for modern mathematics and physics--a quite unexpected feat. HENRY WALTERBRANN Takoma Park, Maryland Hegels Lehre vom Menschen: Kommentar zu den 387 bis 482 der "'Enzyklopiidie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften". By Iring Fetscher. (Stuttgard-Bad Cannstatt: Friederich Frommann Verlag, 1970. Pp. 285.) Hegel's Encyclopedia is not a work that has inspired many detailed commentaries. Although it appears to be a definitive expression of the entire fabled Hegelian "system," the 358 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tremendously condensed form of many of the paragraphs, the problematic nature of Boumann's Zusatze, and the copious,, often confusing references to nineteenth-century natural science and psychology present an imposing, formidable task to any potential commentator . Professor Fetscher has tried to make such an analysis more manageable, both by limiting the material covered and by Offering much more of an expository than an analytic commentary. The result...