Hegel’s metaphilosophy of idealism

Abstract

AbstractIf, as Hegel claims, all philosophy is idealism, then defining his philosophy in these terms makes his idealism a metaphilosophy. This most obvious fact about his definition is the most overlooked. It is the key to a definitive, comprehensive and clear‐cut interpretation of Hegel’s idealism. If Hegel defines all philosophy as idealism and thus his own idealism as a metaphilosophy, then his own idealism must be both the same as the old philosophies in this respect and also different in the sense that it embodies self‐conscious awareness. Hegel divides philosophy into pre‐reflective, pre‐speculative, unconscious idealism and his own reflective, speculative, thus self‐conscious, absolute idealism. Missing this obvious fact is the Achilles’ heel of Stern’s non‐mentalistic interpretation in the only other in‐depth study of this topic, the object of this article’s critique. If Hegel’s idealism is a metaphilosophy, then it is a radical mentalistic ontology of mind and its thoughts.