Hegel's ethical organicism

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, I attempt to make sense of Hegel's repeated comparisons between the biological and the social by articulating and defending the claim that social members and the institutions in which they participate are normatively evaluable, for him, in a manner analogous to that of animal organisms and their parts. In arguing for this interpretive thesis, I hope to bring together two Hegelian views (namely, what I shall refer to as his normative essentialism about animal organisms and his organicism about social institutions) and the two corresponding strands in the Hegel literature. On the reading I propose here, Hegel's normative essentialism is not restricted to animal organisms. The pattern of normative evaluation that applies to animal organisms applies also, in remarkably similar ways, to the sphere of ‘Objective Spirit’ and ‘Ethical Life’ as well. I end by raising and answering the objection that Hegel's organicism, as I portray it, has conservative, even reactionary political implications.