Hegel's Concept of Virtue

Abstract

IN RECENT CONSIDERATIONS of Hegel's practical philosophy, little attention has been accorded his account of virtue.' This is not surprising, for Hegel himself gives little systematic consideration. Although he does formulate a doctrine of virtue in his main work of practical philosophy, Philosophy of Right (hereafter PR), he devotes only one paragraph to its elaboration. Moreover, that formulation is placed in the section devoted to Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), which is characterized both by its emphasis on the institutional dimensions of practical philosophy and by its derogation of matters of subjective sentiment and individual morality. Also, Hegel's political philosophy culminates in account of world history seemingly indifferent to questions of virtue. History is an altar on which . . . the of individuals [is] slaughtered.2 If understandable, however, scholarly neglect of Hegel's account of is unfortunate. Proper understanding of this account is central to any appreciation of Hegel's theory of the state, which he presents as a coordination of objective institutional structures and the subjective sentiment expressed by virtue.' In addition, appreciation of Hegel's concept of can enrich debates in practical philosophy today. Anticipating the work of some contemporary moral theorists, Hegel sought to revive elements of Greek ethics. But he did so in a way arguably more sensitive to the problems involved in reviving the classical project under the changed conditions of modern social life. Appreciation of Hegel's position can thus illuminate and help evaluate contemporary efforts to reaffirm the classical tradition of ethics.