Hegel on the calculus of voting

Abstract

Public choice theory attempts to derive conceptually refutable predictions about political outcomes from the rational behavioral calculus individuals. A central problem in this developing body of analysis is that of explaining the voting act itself. Why do individuals vote? Since the value of a person's vote is slight, especially in large electorates, the existence of even small costs should deter voting participation. Alternative and essentially nonrational explanations have seemed to be necessary to explain voter turnouts. The basic paradox of individual participation in elections owes its modern emphasis to Anthony Downs, who devoted considerable attention to measuring the value of an individual's vote,1 and to Gordon Tullock, who characteristically presented the implications of Downs' analysis in their unwelcomed logical purity. 2 Discussions of the voting calculus and its implications for democratic process are found in almost all modern works on the public-choice bookshelf.3