Abstract

PurposeThis study investigates the impact of derivatives as risk management strategy on the value of Malaysian firms. This study also examines the interaction effect between derivatives and managerial ownership on firm value.Design/methodology/approachThe study examines 200 nonfinancial firms engaged in derivatives for the period 2012–2017 using the generalized method of moments (GMM) to establish the influence of derivatives and managerial ownership on firm value. The study refers to two related theories (hedging theory and managerial aversion theory) to explain its findings. Firm value is measured using Tobin's Q with return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as robustness checks.FindingsThe study found evidence on the positive influence of derivatives on firm value as proposed by the hedging theory. However, the study concludes that managers less hedge when they owned more shares based on the negative interaction between derivatives and managerial ownership on firm value. Hedging decision among managers in Malaysian firms therefore does not subscribe to the managerial aversion theory.Research limitations/implicationsThis study focuses on the derivatives (foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity derivatives) and managerial ownership that is deemed relevant and important to the Malaysian firms. Other forms of ownership such as state-/foreign owned and institutional ownership are not covered in this study.Practical implicationsThis study has important implications to managers and investors. First is on the importance of risk management using derivatives to increase firm value, second, the influence of derivatives and managerial ownership on firm value and finally, the quality reporting on derivatives exposure by firms in line with the required accounting standard.Originality/valueThere is limited empirical evidence on the impact of derivatives on firm value as well as the influence of managerial ownership on hedging decisions of Malaysian firms. This study analyzes the influence of derivatives on firm value during the period in which reporting on derivatives in financial reports is made mandatory by the Malaysian regulator, hence avoiding data inaccuracy unlike the previous studies on Malaysia. This study therefore fills the gap in the literature in relation to the risk management strategies using derivatives in Malaysia.

Highlights

  • Many firms and financial institutions collapsed during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and subsequently the 2007/2008 global financial crisis due to poor risk management (Siddika and Haron, 2020)

  • Ameer focused on firm-specific determinants that may influence the use of derivatives among Malaysian firms, while the current study examines the influence of derivatives on the value of firms in Malaysia

  • This study examines the effect of derivatives together with the influence of managerial ownership on hedging decision on firm value

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Summary

Introduction

Many firms and financial institutions collapsed during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and subsequently the 2007/2008 global financial crisis due to poor risk management (Siddika and Haron, 2020). Adam and Fernando (2006) and Lievenbru€ck and Schmid (2014) employed the interaction between derivatives and managerial ownership to examine the increase in firm value when managers used hedging instruments to manage firm risk exposure. Note(s): Tobin’s Q is a measurement for firm value; ROA and ROE are alternate measurements for firm value; DER is total derivatives (notional value/total asset); MO is managerial ownership (total shareholding (direct) owned by managers over the total common shares outstanding), ACCESS is access to financial market (firm that pays dividend in the present year equals to “1” and “0” otherwise); RISK is firm risk (average standard deviation of daily stock returns on the previous year and annualized to yearly return); SIZE is firm size (natural logarithm of total assets); GROWTH is investment growth (ratio of capital expenditure to sales) and LEV is leverage (long-term debt divided by total shareholder’s equity). The AR(1) and AR(2) tests expose the absence of autocorrelation in the model

Hypotheses tested
Findings
Robustness test
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