Abstract
We investigate the effectiveness of hedge fund activism in addressing inefficient R&D investment and creating long-term value at target firms. Using an endogenous growth model to estimate efficient R&D investment levels, we find target firms exhibit a tendency to overinvest in R&D. The likelihood of being targeted and activism announcement returns increase with R&D overinvestment. Despite observable cuts in R&D expenditure following activism, our analysis shows no significant improvement in R&D efficiency over the subsequent three years. Additional tests, controlling for the activist’s objectives, reputation, and stock selection ability, reveal a negative impact of activism on value creation. Our study offers important insights into how hedge fund activism shapes corporate R&D strategies and highlights challenges in achieving sustainable innovation and value enhancement through activist interventions.
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