Hedge fund activism in family firms

Abstract

AbstractResearch SummaryThis article examines the antecedents and outcomes of hedge fund activism in family versus nonfamily firms. We find that activist hedge funds are less likely to initiate campaigns against family firms than nonfamily firms, but the cumulative abnormal returns to announcements of campaigns against family firms exceed those of nonfamily firms. The presence of one or more family members on a firm's board of directors appears to be a key impediment to hedge fund activism in family firms. Additionally, activist hedge funds are more likely to use hostile tactics and demand more substantive changes in their campaigns against family firms than nonfamily firms. Together, these findings contribute to the agency theory‐based literatures on hedge fund activism, family firms, boards of directors, and corporate governance.Managerial SummaryActivist hedge funds are a significant force in corporate governance, driving the companies they target to change their strategies, structures, and leadership. Family firms are prevalent and economically important, accounting for a third to a half of companies worldwide. This article compares hedge fund activism in family versus nonfamily firms. Activist hedge funds are about 41% less likely to initiate campaigns against family than nonfamily firms, but the average returns to successful activist hedge fund campaigns against family firms are about 2% higher than in nonfamily firms. These effects are especially pronounced when family members serve on a company's board of directors. Furthermore, activist hedge funds are more likely to use hostile tactics and demand more substantive changes in campaigns against family than nonfamily firms.