Abstract
AbstractThis paper considers the welfare effects of health insurance. With a rather general model, we show that the presence of traditional health insurance makes consumers worse off when the marginal cost of health care is low enough, while always making the health care provider better off. The presence of traditional health insurance increases social welfare, but cannot achieve the socially optimal outcome. Furthermore, we consider a market structure called “integrated health insurance” and show that in a health care market where a firm provides not only health care but also health insurance, the socially optimal outcome can be achieved.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
