Health information exchange network under collaboration, cooperation, and competition: A game-theoretic approach.

Abstract

Health Information Exchange (HIE) network allows securely accessing and sharing healthcare-related information among healthcare providers (HCPs) and payers. HIE services are provided by a non-profit/profit organizations under several subscription plans options. A few studies have addressed the sustainability of the HIE network such that HIE providers, HCPs, and payers remain profitable in the long term. However, none of these studies addressed the coexistence of multiple HIE providers in the network. Such coexistence may have a huge impact on the behavior of healthcare systems in terms of adoption rate and HIE pricing strategies. In addition, in spite of all the effort to maintain cooperation between HIE providers, there is still a chance of competition among them in the market. Possible competition among service providers leads to many concerns about the HIE network sustainability and behavior. In this study, a game-theoretic approach to model the HIE market is proposed. Game-theory is used to simulate the behavior of the three different HIE network agents in the HIE market: HIE providers, HCPs, and payers. Pricing strategies and adoption decisions are optimized using a Linear Programming (LP) mathematical model. Results show that the relation between HIEs in the market is crucial to HCP/Payer adoption decision specially to small HCPs. A small change in the discount rate proposed by a competitive HIE provider will highly affect the decision of HCP/payers to join the HIE network. Finally, competition opened the opportunity for more HCPs to join the network due to reduced pricing. Furthermore, collaborative HIEs provided better performance compared to cooperative in terms of profit and HCP adoption rate by sharing their overall costs and revenues.