Headquarters′ monitoring mechanisms, subsidiaries’ financial slack, and the contingent role of subsidiaries′ external embeddedness

Abstract

Within MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries financial slack, i.e., uncommitted financial resources in excess of those needed for current operations, may incur costs for headquarters. These costs may emanate from subsidiaries' decision to forego investment opportunities and stockpile cash instead, which, in turn, may lead to fewer resources being available for redistribution within the organization. From an agency theory perspective, headquarters can minimize these costs through monitoring mechanisms. While agency theory is considered theoretically appropriate for the study of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, it reflects a rather undersocialized manifestation of human behaviour, which in turn limits its applicability. In this paper, we attempt to address this limitation by suggesting and empirically exploring that the effect of monitoring mechanisms is dependent (1) on the different types of monitoring used, and (2) on subsidiaries' external embeddedness. Drawing on empirical evidence from 94 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece, we provide some initial evidence on the differential impact of monitoring through expatriates and monitoring through bureaucratic processes. Most importantly, we show that subsidiaries' structural embeddedness moderates both associations. In doing so, we reveal that whether subsidiaries behave opportunistically or as good citizens is partially determined by the social context in which they are embedded. An unexpected finding concerns the positive effect of the origin of the CEO on subsidiaries' financial slack for expatriates compared to local managers. This finding underscores the importance of the CEO identity, and highlights the need for future research exploring its effect on subsidiaries' performance.