Abstract
ABSTRACT Most Africanist scholars stress the importance of clientelism in determining electoral outcomes and patrimonialism and the use of force in enabling ruling parties to prolong their stay in power. This article, which draws upon various instances of participant observation and interviews regarding the 2021 elections in Zambia, contributes to the few studies that emphasise the limits of clientelism and patrimonialism in African politics and the agency of voters or subordinate groups to hold their leaders accountable. It does so by showing how Zambian voters sought to secure benefits from clientelist campaigns, patrimonial rule and trade union campaigns to win changes in state policies, publicly promising reciprocity and loyalty when under the gaze of the ruling party actors, only to vote them out of power.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
