Abstract

AbstractTo save money and avoid redundancy, states may choose to combine complementary areas of policy implementation into a single bureaucratic agency or ministry. This is often the case with environmental protection, a policy area that is inarguably interdisciplinary in its aims and functions. A number of scholars have noted that the combination of policy mandates may lead to the neglect of certain agency functions, particularly when one of the mandates is regulatory whereas the other is nonregulatory in nature. However, what occurs when environmental protection is combined with a seemingly complementary and relevant policy area, such as public health? In this article, I argue that the combination of these policy areas will lead to the elevation of public health goals and preferences over those of environmental enforcement. Using the American states as a case, I find through interviews with environmental and public health employees, text analysis, and empirical analyses that public health functions and goals are prioritized within combined agencies. That prioritization leads to fewer punitive actions taken by the agencies during the regulatory process. Given the popularity of “multitask” agencies, it is imperative to understand how even the most convenient and reasonable combinations may affect day‐to‐day environmental protection efforts.

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