Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a generalization of the concept of sufficientarianism, extending it to assess allocations across multiple consumption goods. For a fixed society of agents, sufficientarianism posits that allocations are compared according to the number of individuals whose consumption is considered to be sufficient. Central to our discussion is a newly introduced ethical principle of ‘sufficientrarian judgment.’ This principle asserts that if starting from an allocation in which all agents have identical consumption and a change in one agent's consumption hurts society, then there would be no change in the consumption of any other agent that could subsequently benefit society. Sufficientarianism is shown to be equivalent to sufficientarian judgment, symmetry, and separability. We investigate our axioms in both specific economic environments and abstract environments. Finally, we argue formally that sufficientarian judgment is closely related to the leximin principle.