Abstract
The recall (the removal of elected representatives following a special election) has received increased attention in recent years. From the 2003 recall of the Governor of California, through failed recall attempts in Romania and Venezuela, the mechanism has been championed by reformers as a means of holding elected politicians to account. Yet no comparative study has been undertaken to empirically test the effect of the provision. Combining qualitative information with quantitative data, this article analyses if the recall has served its function of creating more responsive representatives. There is some (limited) evidence that the recall has improved trust in government in the US and to a degree in British Columbia. But overall the recall has—paradoxically—tended to strengthen politicians who win recall elections.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
