Harnessing Inertia to Improve Army Enlisted Service Length: A Case for Opt-Out Enlistment Contracts

Abstract

Army recruiting, initial entry training, and retention enterprises consume tremendous manpower resources and become disproportionately more expensive and challenging as the size of the Army increases. Fortunately, empirical evidence suggests that the Army could readily improve enlisted continuation rates by changing enlistment contracts from its present form, requiring soldiers to reenlist or opt-in to continue service, to open-ended enlistment contracts that require soldiers to opt-out of service upon fulfilling their service obligations. Changing enlistment contracts to an opt-out paradigm—similar to how officer populations are currently managed—could greatly increase the number of soldiers who continue service past their initial enlistment obligation. Improved continuation rates could save the Army hundreds of millions in recruiting and reenlistment incentives, as well as freeing thousands of Non-Commissioned Officers serving as recruiters, drill sergeants, and retention specialist to support other operational requirements.