Harms and Wrongs

Abstract

Feinberg’s Harm Principle is not Mill’s Harm Principle. Mill’s principle was exclusive: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Feinberg’s principle, by contrast, tells us only that “it is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing . . . harm to persons other than the actor,” and not whether there could also be other good reasons. It is one “liberty-limiting principle,” specifying one kind of consideration that “is always a morally relevant reason in support of penal legislation,” legislation that, by criminalizing conduct, limits citizens’ liberty. But for all we know so far, there could also be other such principles that specify other morally relevant reasons for thus limiting liberty. Feinberg would come closer to Mill if he held to the “extreme liberal position,” that the Harm Principle specifies the only kind of good reason for criminalization, but that is not his position, for three reasons. First, he hopes at best to sustain the “liberal position.” This means that only effective prevention of harm or “serious offense” to others constitute “good reasons for criminal