Harmonized Legislative Management on Constructing International Enforceable Arbitral Awards in Decentralized Post-Award Bargaining Systems

Abstract

Harmonized legislative managements on national legislations for balancing the arbitral interests of the parties in post-award reviews is worth exploring for the reasons of little discussion about the uniform legislative control on the variables of post-award procedures in different jurisdictions and the enhancement of post-award renegotiations or court-facilitated mediations for constructing international enforceable arbitral awards. The purpose of this paper is to study the efficiency, fairness, and sustainability of the grounds for the consolidation of international enforceability of arbitral awards. The author examined cases on the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards with comparative studies on Federal Arbitration Act, ZPO (Ger.), C.P.C. (Fr.) and explored the trends of legal harmonization, the restatements of arbitration laws, the procedural delocalization of arbitral proceedings. Firstly, the author studied international arbitral legislative coordination of constructing international enforceability of arbitral awards for balancing legitimacy interests and efficacy costs of post-award reviews. Secondly, the author schemed the frameworks of building up arbitral resilience in international enforceability of arbitral awards and the role of courts in supervising arbitrations. Thirdly, the author studied two models for the post-award bargaining: legislative optimal control problem and post-award efficiency bargaining processes, to understand the incentive structures of legislative optimization. Firstly, judging from the convergent results of bilateral bargaining model, the author suggested that elevating the party’s arbitral interests valuation since guaranteeing the allocation efficiency of post-award bargaining mechanism is not possible. Secondly, the author concluded that to solve the optimal control problem of international legislative coordination for consolidating the international enforceability of arbitral awards, enhancing the self-organization of national legislative control is helpful since the equilibrium is non-optimal in decentralized bargaining systems. Thirdly, the author emphasized the post-award renegotiations designed by national arbitrations for constructing international enforceable awards by improving the incentive structures of harmonized legislative managements.