Abstract
The paper mounts a critique of ideas of pluralism and judicial dialogue in the European Union. It aims to challenge the orthodox view that legal pluralism in the European Union is an empirical fact, which generates problems of normative conflicts that in turn can be solved through some process of judicial dialogue. The paper argues that this view is premised on a controversial theoretical position about the nature of law, which distorts the normative character of the relationship between different courts in Europe. It then advances an alternative account of law and fundamental rights that both explains why legal conflicts do not exist and offers normative guidance to how European judges and other officials should act.
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