Hare's Error

Abstract

A large portion of the work of moral philosopher R. M. Hare presents his attempt to ground normative ethics on mctaethics— the logic of moral reasoning and the meanings of the moral words. According to Hare's metaethical analysis, moral judgments are to be understood in terms of universal prescriptivism, which yields an act utilitarian account of morality at the normative level. While I find many attractive features in Hare's account of normative ethics, I believe Hare fails to demonstrate that the logical analysis of the moral concepts entails the normative theory he defends. The act utilitarian principle of morality is at best merely one possible principle that derives support from or is consistent with a Harean account of metaethics. As it stands, Hare's metaethical analysis is incapable of grounding any specific normative theory on its own. According to Hare's account of moral philosophy, the first steps in confronting and resolving moral issues call for an understanding of the meanings of the moral words and the logical properties that govern rational thought about moral questions. Hare emphasizes that come into moral philosophy asking certain moral questions, and the questions are posed in terms of certain If we go on trying to answer those questions, we are stuck with those concepts. 2 Thus Hare focuses on concepts such as ought and wrong, concepts that people actually use in the moral questions they ask. He maintains that understanding the meanings of such terms will yield certain logical properties, which in turn will determine the answers offered to these questions at the normative level. Since my concern focuses on Hare's move from the metaethical to the normative, it is crucial to examine the logical properties that give rise to our normative conclusions on Hare's account. Hare introduces three logical properties of moral judgments: universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness. According to