Abstract

According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non-existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)’s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech’s dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. It remains the case, however, that HA cannot capture certain iterated de re possibilities of non-existence and that it is committed to a stock of necessary existents. But I still think that the virtues of the view outweigh these costs.

Highlights

  • According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world

  • HA grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world, which is an appealing alternative to a long tradition of using questionable ontological categories such as abstracta or possibilia to account for modality

  • The account is realist about modality in that it takes facts about modality to be mind-independent and it does not seek to reduce the modal to the non-modal, rather it seeks to explain all metaphysical modality in terms of a single modal primitive: potentiality

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Summary

Introduction

According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. To admit other merely possible futures to make sense of AV’s potentiality for (and the possibility of) Vetter’s non-existence, as well as other potentialities whose manifestation would contradict the actual future.

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