Hans Küng on Propositions and their Problematic: A Critique

Abstract

HANS KUNG ON PROPOSITIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMATIC: A CRITIQUE I N HIS BOOK on infallibility 1 Hans Kung has made of use an " auxiliary " philosophical argument to support his general conclusion that no set of propositions can a priori be said to be infallible. His argument takes the following form. Articles of faith are propositions. Formulas of faith, professions of faith, and definitions of faith, are propositions-simple or complex -and are not a priori free from the laws that govern propositions. Nor are propositions of faith ever directly God's word, but at best God's word attested and mediated by man's word: perceptible and transmissible by human propositions. But, as such, propositions of faith participate in the problematic of human propositions in general.2 Kung claims that his aim is " a very modest one." He will make use of certain "basic and scarcely disputable observations" about propositions in order to make clear "that propositions -of which the Church's faith has to make use-are a problematic affair. The obvious conclusion will be that a Church which summarizes or defines its faith in propositions and perhaps has to do this, cannot get away from the problematic inherent in propositions as such." 3 Kung's point seems to be that ' a consideration of certain "general laws" about propositions will substantiate the conclusion that all propositions have what he terms an inherent "capacity for error," and that therefore dogmatic propositions must also share inherent " capacity for error" which capacity, according to Kung, is incompatible with the claim that they are infallible. 1 Hans Kiing, Infallible? An Inquiry, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, 1971). 2 Ibid., p. 157. • Ibid., p. 158. 758 754 VINCENT M. COOKE In the first part of this article I will argue that there is no such problematic of propositions such as Kling alleges, and that his "basic and scarcely disputable observations" about propositions are either false, nonsensical, or have nothing to do with the conclusion he wants to establish. Propositions are really unproblematic. In the concluding section of this article I will propose an alternative way in which one could reformulate Kling's central proposals without employing highly questionable philosophical theses. Whether Kling's position, reformulated clearly, is acceptable or not is something for theologians , not a philosopher, to decide. Kling has written an important theological treatise. It would be a shame if philosophical imprecision were to distract from the central theological -arguments . Kling proposes five laws about propositions. First of all, he suggests that " propositions fall short of reality: this is fundamental . I can never totally capture reality either by a word or by a proposition, simple or complex. There always remains a difference between what I want to state and what I do state, between my intention and my spoken word." 4 Kling here has perhaps been misled by his highly picturesque ~ay of talking . A few remarks, of obvious Wittgensteinian inspiration, may make this clear. How can one know that his propositions " fall short " of reality? Can they sometimes "go beyond" reality? If reality cannot be " captured " by a word or a proposition, what can it be "captured" by? What precisely is meant by this "reality "? Is it appropriate to ask how big it is? It must surely be very big if propositions cannot capture it! One wants to say that language sometimes goes on a holiday. " But surely there is always a difference between what I want to say and what I do say, between my intention and my spoken word." Indeed sometimes this may be so. But as a general truth about propositions it is false. When I see the white snow outside and say "The snow is white," I have said • Ibid., p. 158. HANS KUNG ON PROPOSITIONS & THEIR PROBLEMATIC 755 exactly what I want to say, i.e., that the snow is white. "But didn't your intention go beyond that?" No, I did not have an intention at all. Kling gives an example: " What would be conveyed if the Church were to define the proposition (which is certainly fundamental),' God exists'? Everything-and yet so infinitely little and almo~t nothing at all by comparison to what might...