Hanoi's Strategic Perspective and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict

Abstract

S INCE JANUARY 1979, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has been beset by pressures which have appeared to many observers to be irresistible. While a hostile China threatens its northern border and supports insurgents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam itself, the S.R.V. is almost totally dependent economically on the Soviet bloc and is unable to obtain sufficient capital and technology for its economic development. Already suffering a reduction in the desperately low standard of living it had after many years of war, Vietnam seems certain to face even more hardship in the future. Moreover, Vietnam's foes believe they can maintain these pressures indefinitely, inflicting heavy penalties on Vietnam without cost or risk to themselves. Sooner or later, according to this view, Vietnam will be forced to make major concessions on Kampuchea to China and its ASEAN neighbors in order to obtain the lifting of these pressures. The Vietnamese view of the situation, however, is dramatically different. Hanoi defines the conflict primarily in terms of a Chinese strategy, supported by the U.S., to weaken Vietnam and ultimately force its subordination to Chinese interests. Hanoi believes that, in the end, it will prevail over its Chinese foes, and that the present coalition opposing Vietnam's dominance in Kampuchea will break up. The Vietnamese liken the conflict with China to their struggles against the French and the Americans in the past, and they judge that, in a protracted war, the weaknesses inherent in China's strategy will become increasingly clear. Hanoi's confidence about the outcome of its conflict with China is rooted as much in the Vietnamese leadership's Marxist-Leninist beliefs as it is in the strength of Vietnamese nationalism. The greatest source of confusion about Vietnamese foreign policy decision-making in the past has been the failure to appreciate the central importance of ideologically-derived assumptions in the Vietnamese worldview. This system of beliefs about the nature of historical change constitutes the core of Hanoi's strategic perspective on its conflicts with outside powers. Like other Communist parties, the Vietnamese party has based its political line and strategy at each new turning-point in the revolution on its analysis of the relationship of forces (so sanh luc luong) between the