Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Philosophy

Abstract

Many recent interpretations of Hannah Arendt's work, such as those of Bonnie Honig (1) and Dana Villa, (2) have placed it in proximity with claims about thought. Using term the as it is often distinguished from the I refer here to a nonfoundational orientation in thinking. More precisely, unlike modern, does not aspire to uncover origin, basic level, true essence, or pure core of phenomena that it studies. While modern thought is motivated by aim of exposing some authentic level of reality, postmodem, on contrary, adopts view that there is no foundation to be unveiled. Instead of concentrating on possibility of unveiling, a thinker in this sense pays attention at constructed nature of layers in phenomena and decisive role that action and power plays in construction. (3) Dana Villa situates Arendt's work in general as postmetaphysical, while Bonnie Honig stresses role of in it. Performativity is strongly related to in above sense, particularly since Derrida-Searle debate of 1977 about relevance of John Austin's speech-act theory, in which Searle accentuated intention of speaker and differentiated between real speech and mere imitation, whereas Derrida argued that in order to function performative requires a cultural practice that consists of repetition and presupposes imitativeness. (4) The concept of performativity has in consequent discussion gained meaning that surpasses original Austinian speech-act theory and has begun to function as a sign for crucial role that imitation and repetition plays within all productions of meaning and within construction of in general. The best known example is Judith Butler's theorizing of of gender as performative: We have gender and understand what gender is because gender is imitable and produced through countless repetitions. (5) In both Villa's and Honig's accounts, Arendt is presented as postmodern in this sense. She is seen as a nonfoundationalist thinker who effectively temporalizes and perspectivizes everything allegedly basic and self-identical. She is also seen as a thinker who conceives of all identities as doing rather than as being. This post modernizing interpretation is easily linked with view of social construction of gender as well as sexual and ethnic identities. Indeed, many interpreters have found at least potential for an account of social construction of gender and ethnicity in Arendt's work. (6) While not seeking to ignore flavor of some of Arendt's work, I see need at this juncture to emphasize that Arendt's work also contains plenty of clearly modern, and could even say high modernist, aspects and themes. In this context, it is useful to remember that twentieth-century analytical philosophy was not only tendency striving to purify, to achieve some basic ground from which to create something new from a pure beginning. Phenomenological-existential philosophy, in which Arendt was immersed, had similar aspirations. The attempt to think without searching for origin, without looking for authenticity, foundation, or beginning, understanding each not as something original, not as being but as doing, has set itself consciously against both of these modern traditions of philosophy. I will especially study tension between modern and themes in Arendt's work in relation to questions of identity. By identity I refer not only to so-called social identity, but even more so with classical concept of as one and same.,, (7) The question of of gender or ethnic in Arendt's work may be specified in this context in following question: Does Arendt assume that there are, in some natural or original way, two genders that in themselves are self-identical? …