Hannah Arendt and Critical Theory: A Critical Response

Abstract

G ERARD P. HEATHER and Matthew Stolz's article, Hannah Arendt and the Problem of Theory, appearing in this journal in February, 1979, celebrates the brilliance of Arendt's theorizing, but it makes important and instructive mistakes as it does. 1 The authors' enthusiasm for Arendt's work is unfortunately marred in its substantive expression by superficial analysis of the to which they allude, and more seriously, by severe misinterpretation of the recent work of the most prolific of contemporary theorists, Jurgen Habermas. Rather than re-outlining their argument and fully re-assessing their analysis, the following critical remarks follow the development of their essay and attempt to correct the substantive misrepresentations of Habermas's widely read and vigorously debated work on a critical theory of society. The relevant page number will precede the commentary on Heather and Stolz's claims. (Page 3) To begin, Heather and Stolz identify Critical Theory largely with Habermas's work. Then, after they quote Herbert Marcuse to the effect that, Practice follows truth, and not vice versa, their generalizations begin. Contrary to their implication, Habermas does not take such one-sided position, nor do the several volumes of his work published in English over the past decade lead one to such an awkward stance. His analyses of speech, political discourse, and symbolic action more generally are closely tied to