HANMRE - An authenticated encryption secure against side-channel attacks for nonce-misuse and lightweight approaches

Abstract

Side-channel threat is a form of cryptanalysis that takes advantage of secret information leaked during program implementations, through measurement and evaluation of systematic parameters, such as execution time, power consumption and electromagnetic field (EMF) radiation. Since various side-channel analysis techniques have applied successfully in gathering data and extracting cryptographic keys on variety of devices and platforms, including smartphones, smart cards, tablets, TVs, FPGAs and CPUs, these attacks constitute a significant risk to the security of cryptographic systems. Eliminating serious leakages is a major approach to mitigate side-channel vulnerabilities, in particular Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). During the last decade, several research aimed at securing cryptographic primitive algorithms against side-channel attacks, and validating possible countermeasures under assumption which its computational complexity can be estimated precisely. In this paper, we propose a hash-based authenticated nonce-misuse resistant encryption, namely HANMRE which is adaptable for a lightweight leakage resilient authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme. The HANMRE construction has been designed for the side-channel security achievement (including SPA and DPA attacks) and highly integrated for restrained environments with limited resource. The advantage of this scheme is ensuring the strong security developed in misuse-resistant schemes against general adversaries for authenticated encryption [1]. It also presents reasonable implementation results (especially long message handling) compared to existing authenticated encryption schemes and is expected to be a novel idea for better approaches of authenticated encryption mechanisms design in the future.