Hands‐on or hands‐off? Anti‐corruption agencies in action, donor expectations, and a good enough reality

Abstract

AbstractThe article reviews a number of reports and articles on both the roles and purpose of Anti‐Corruption Agencies or Commissions (ACC) to set the context for its empirical research. The research draws on field visits to two African countries (Ghana and Uganda) in 1999, and visits to these and three further African countries (Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia) in 20041 to study agencies whose remit includes anti‐corruption work—to consider the relevance and reality of the issues and themes raised in the review. The visits to Ghana and Uganda offer, for the first time, longitudinal perspectives on the development of ACCs and donor involvement.While the research generally confirms issues raised in the review, this perspective provides the basis for the development of three hypotheses new to the study of ACCs. These are: is there, paradoxically, an adverse impact on the development of ACCs as a consequence of mounting pressure from donors for anti‐corruption results; whether the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is the most relevant ACC model; and whether better results may be achieved with sequenced or less donor involvement using ACCs and other organisations? This clearly has practitioner and policy relevance for the future role and development of existing ACCs within current circumstances and for decisions on the creation of new ACCs. The agencies visited in 2004 were those with a responsibility for addressing corruption: the Anti‐Corruption Bureau (ACB) in Malawi; the Inspectorate of Government (IG), Uganda; the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (GHRAJ) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Ghana; the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), Tanzania; the Anti‐Corruption Commission (ACC), Zambia. The agencies in Ghana and Uganda were previously visited in 1999. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.