Handling risks from intercepting a route on the internet using a risk-oriented global routing model

Abstract

Global routing incidents have increasingly occurred in recent years, becoming a new large-scale cyber threat. Cyberattacks on global internet routing are used to unauthorizedly change package forwarding paths in order to intercept information, destabilize whole or part of the network, disrupt access to certain information resources, etc. The mechanisms of these cyberattacks are aimed at imposing on the subjects of global routing a misconception about the topology of the network in the absence of mechanisms for validation of this information in the global routing protocol BGP-4. In any case, a complete replacement should not be expected in the coming decade. Thus, the problem of information security during firewall exchange requires a new methodology. The methodology proposed in the article is based on the analysis of internet topology, subjects, objects and processes of global routing, as well as risk management, which is a modern approach in information security. The owner of the risk has been identified, the risks themselves have been identified. New metrics have been introduced to assess the risk of intercepting routes – trust metrics and metrics of significance. As a result, a risk-oriented model of global routing is obtained, describing the relationship of Internet nodes in terms of the risk of route interception. This allows you to simulate the most effective topology, where the effectiveness criterion is risk assessment as a measure of information security. The article demonstrates the practical results of the use of risk-oriented models of global routing for the assessment and modeling of inter-network relations in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet.