Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge

Abstract

There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: (1) knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well‐founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity‐based approach—and (2) knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well‐founded belief that there are no conflicting possibilities—a possibility‐based approach. Hale argues for the first of these claims, but I contend that his arguments fail. However, it doesn't follow that we should endorse a possibility‐based approach. I repurpose Hale's arguments to show those who would endorse possibility‐based approaches need to say more about our modal knowledge concerning logic and mathematics; if they can't, then they ought to endorse a hybrid modal epistemology that doesn't give priority to one modality across the board. Additionally, those who endorse possibility‐based views may be committed to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism.