Haecceities and Nonexistent Possible Individuals

Abstract

I have argued that there are nonqualitative haecceities,1 and that if this is the case, then there is a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions.2 I conclude that there exists a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. It seems that if there are abstracta of these kinds, then metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of them. Therefore, it appears that metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. In particular, it is highly plausible that a possibility or possible world is identifiable with an abstractum,that is, a proposition or property, or conjunction of them.3 Using a term coined by Alvin Plantinga, the view which endorses such an identification will be called Modal Realism.4 I shall argue that the postulation of unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities is justified because Modal Realism requires the existence of such properties.