Habermas’s Communicative Concepts of Power

Abstract

Jurgen Habermas (1982b) sees his project as both a continuation and a critical evaluation of earlier critical theory (which primarily means the works of the Frankfurt School). On the one hand, Habermas agrees with earlier critical theory's attempt to shift from the critique of the political economy to the critique of the socio-cultural sphere. That is, the problem of power and domination in late capitalist societies is no longer mainly to do with inequalities and exploitation in the production sphere. Instead, power, in the name of rationality, extends itself to the socio-cultural sphere to instrumentalize our action orientation. The critique of the instrumental rationality becomes the major task of critical theory. On the other hand, Habermas considers the major weakness of earlier critical theory as lying in its confusion of reason with mis instrumental form of rationality. In his view, earlier critical tiieory adopts a totalist critique of Western reason, and hence turns its back on the very foundation of critique. In other words, for Habermas, the basis of critical theory is undermined by the line that the Frankfurt School pursues. Therefore from the beginning Habermas has been preoccupied with two tasks: first, searching for the ground of critique, and second, providing a critique of power in modern societies. Habermas's theory of communicative action, which seeks to demonstrate an internal relation between reason and communication, can be seen as an attempt to accomplish these two tasks. For Habermas, his theory of communicative action provides not only a basis of critique in reason, but also a yardstick according to which one can differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. This essay focuses primarily on the second task, that is, how Habermas uses his theory of communicative action to provide a critique of power. Habermas's critique of power consists in a differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power. This differentiation, for him, is also a differentiation between reason and force. Illegitimate power is one which is connected to force and implies a problem of coercion. Legitimate power, on the other hand, is one which is connected to reason. His notion of communicative reason, he asserts, provides the basis for legitimate power. He considers power which is based on the consensus achieved in communicative action as legitimate and connected to reason. This legitimate power, for Habermas, is separated from force and avoids the problem of coercion. In this essay, I intend to examine whether Habermas's communicative concept of power is successful in resolving the problem of coercion which he perceives in a relation of force. I would like to point out that throughout his discussions of power, Habermas does not have only one way of applying the concept of communicative action but uses it in different ways and hence produces different versions of communicative concept of power.11 shall delineate two distinct versions of Habermas's communicative concept of power: an earlier version which conceives legitimate power as arising in communicative action; a later version which conceives power in terms of purposive-instrumental action of which the legitimacy is defined by determination of collective goals in communicative action. There are questions that I would like to put to Habermas. In producing the earlier version of communicative concept of power, Habermas criticizes instrumental-strategic action in terms of its relation to force and coercion, and determines to have a notion of legitimate power which is under the category of communicative action. He argues that legitimate power only arises in communicative action. His later version of communicative concept of power, however, understands legitimate power in terms of instrumental-purposive action rather than as a form of communicative action. Is there any contradiction incurred by upholding these two different versions of communicative concept of power? …