Abstract
Habermas's vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled with many of the concerns of proponents of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal values. However, his account underestimates the challenge that diversity poses to collective identity and the fundamental nature of value conflict. If discursive approaches to justice are to accommodate such claims, they must abandon the Habermasian search for consensus in favour of a vision of liberalism which acknowledges the plurality and incommensurability of fundamental values and which consequently accepts the pervasiveness of value conflict. Whereas Habermas fears that such a perspective will reduce political disputes to purely strategic struggles for power, such worries can be addressed through innovative forms of joint governance.
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