Guo Xiang on Self-so Knowledge

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe perspective on zhi 知 (‘knowledge’) is often identified as a key distinction between the Zhuangzi 莊子 and its most famous commentator, Guo Xiang 郭象. Many scholars who recognize this distinction observe that zhi almost always has negative connotations in Guo Xiang’s writing, whereas certain types of knowledge can be positive in the Zhuangzi (e.g. da zhi 大知 ‘greater knowledge’ or zhen zhi 真知 ‘genuine knowledge’.) In this way, Guo Xiang’s comments on zhi seem to stray from the ‘original meaning’ of the Zhuangzi, and are often dismissed as inaccurate mis-readings, imbued with mysticism and relativism. However, by taking into consideration some aspects of Guo Xiang’s socio-historical context, and the larger structure of his complex philosophical system, we find a project quite distinct from that of the Zhuangzi. Like many other Wei-Jin period thinkers, Guo aims bridging some of the gaps the Daoist classic creates between itself and the Confucian tradition. This exposes Guo Xiang’s first goal, which, like his intellectual contemporaries, is to unify Daoist and Confucian ideas. In addition, I will argue that if we look at the larger context of Guo Xiang’s own philosophical approach, and interpret his notion of zhi within this framework, then we find a strong argument for an alternative to the epistemological perspectives in the Zhuangzi – one that includes mysticism and relativism, but goes beyond them.