Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds

Abstract

Abstract “You can’t be convicted of a crime without a guilty act and a guilty mind.” A lawyer might express the same idea using Latin: “You can’t be convicted of a crime without actus reus and mens rea.” Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds proposes an interpretation of mens rea and actus reus as limits on the authority of a democratic state to ascribe guilt through positive law to those accused of crime. Actus reus and mens rea are portrayed as necessary conditions for the legitimacy of state punishment. The actus reus requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority to ascribe guilt to those who didn’t realize they were committing a crime, provided they lacked the capacity to realize they were committing a crime, or to those who realized they were committing a crime, but who lacked the capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law. The mens rea requirement disables a democratic state from using its authority to ascribe guilt to those who didn’t realize they were committing a crime, provided their ignorance manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law, or to those who realized they were committing a crime, but whose failure to conform to the law nonetheless manifested no lack of law-abiding concern for the law. Ascriptions of guilt are illegitimate, and not merely unjust, when a defendant’s choice fails to satisfy the requirements of actus reus and mens rea.