Abstract
Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciato, Pierre de l’Estoile: Renaissance Interpreters of Roman Law Michael L. Monheit In the Renaissance, jurists and other scholars intensely debated the problem of how to interpret correctly the Corpus iuris civilis (CIC), Justinian’s great sixth-century-ad compilation of Roman law. 1 Yet by the sixteenth century jurists had been closely interpreting its texts for four centuries; indeed Roman law jurists, much more than pre-Reformation theologians, innovated through close commentary on the text (a characteristic sometimes wrongly considered a humanist innovation). Assuming that these texts were fully consistent, largely lacking a sense of historical distance, they “found” the CIC’s dictum on a given question by weaving many passages that seemed to address it partially into a complex logical fabric, and eliminated apparent internal conceptual disparities in the same way. 2 But from the fifteenth century such humanists as Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) and Angelo Politiano (1454–94) applied humanist critical methods to the CIC and ridiculed the methods of the civilians. In the early sixteenth century the work of Guillaume Budé (1468–1540), Andrea Alciato (1492–1550), and Ulrich Zasius (1461–1535) intensified the crisis in legal interpretation. Budé, the [End Page 21] period’s leading French humanist, was the first humanist to publish an exhaustive study of Justinian’s Digest, while the Milanese jurist Alciato and the German jurist Zasius were among the first humanist-trained Roman lawyers to tackle the CIC. Across the century’s first three decades these humanists debated each other and other jurists, including the eminent Orléans professor of Roman law, Pierre de l’Estoile (1480–1537), best known to scholars as the teacher of a youthful law student named Jean Calvin. 3 We consider here a debate between Budé, Alciato, and Estoile, which also involved Nicolas Duchemin, Estoile’s student and partisan, and Calvin himself, who made his first appearance in print by contributing a preface to the work of his friend Duchemin. Though often referred to in Calvin scholarship, the debate has never been thoroughly explored. 4 [End Page 22] Unlike some recent studies of interpretation in the Renaissance, this study focuses on each interpreter’s practice, rather than his explicit methodological pronouncements alone, on what Wittgenstein calls a writer’s “language game”—here the meaning of each interpreter’s statements in the context of his interpretive practices. Indeed we shall view this debate as a clash of three “forms of life,” since the three protagonists could not agree as to what rules to follow to determine the meaning of a particular expression. 5 In the passage in question, Lex Nec quicquam, §Ubi decretum, from the Digest section On the Duties of the Proconsul and Legate (D.1.16.9.1), the third century Imperial jurist Ulpian, declares: Ubi decretum necessarium est per libellum id expedire proconsul non poterit: Omnia enim quaecunque causae cognitionem desiderant per libellum non possunt expediri. (Where a decretum [decree] is required, the proconsul will not be able to dispose of the matter per libellum. All matters whatsoever requiring causae cognitio [judicial investigation] cannot be disposed of per libellum.) In unravelling the meaning of such key terms as decretum and libellus, the interpreters applied assumptions and practices rooted in both the humanist and [End Page 23] scholastic traditions—sometimes the same individual applied both. The debate presents the issue of interpretation apart from that of textual recovery, for no participant claimed any passage involved had been corrupted or offered a significant variant. Had they possessed the Mommsen edition of the CIC (albeit without necessarily understanding its principles of construction), each would have faced little added difficulty. I. Guillaume Budé on §Ubi decretum Guillaume Budé sparked the debate with his comments on the passage in the first part of his famous study of Justinian’s Digest, the Annotationes in quattuor & viginti Pandectarum libros (1508). He argued that the term libellus as used in the passage meant a supplicatory petition addressed to the Emperor. The matters involved could include both controversial cases, for which the Emperor would rely on the judgment of his council, and uncontested matters in which Emperors acted by their own “liberality or beneficence.” Budé confined himself to the...
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