Abstract

This article examines three hypotheses on the guerrillas in Colombia. First, the armed insurrection in Colombia escalated dramatically in the last dozen years to a point that it created a serious challenge to the central government. The National Dialogue in the mid‐1980s indicated this recognition by the regime. Second, the narcotraficantes posed a parallel threat that strained the government's legitimacy at the same time. Third, the crisis became so acute that the political elite could no longer leave a guerrilla group out of the electoral process when it offered to participate as a legitimate actor.

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