Abstract
This chapter examines how problems and politics in the nascent alliances and alignments in both the communist and anticommunist camps affected security relations between the two camps in the first years of the Cold War. It shows how the uncertain and poorly defined nature of U.S. commitment to its partners in East Asia undercut the credibility of the nation's near-term threats and long-term assurances in coercive diplomacy. It argues that North Korea's invasion of South Korea that started the Korean War was rooted in a combination of communist elites' underestimation of the resolve and power of the United States to counter such an aggression in the near term and an inflated view of Japan's likely future role in the security politics of the region after its full economic and military recovery from World War II.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
