Abstract
AbstractThe Chilcot report set out in detail its finding that the Blair Government had been prone to groupthink in its decision-making processes when leading Britain into the Iraq War. Subsequent British prime ministers have been in no hurry to change their style of governing in ways that might broaden decision-making circles and introduce the ‘challenge’ that Chilcot said had been lacking. This article draws on the literature on the psychology of group decision-making to examine the extent to which groupthink remains embedded in the processes of cabinet government in the UK. The article argues that the strongest driver of groupthink is the psychological disposition towards conflict of individual prime ministers. Drawing on interviews with ministers, civil servants and special advisers we suggest that the political authority of the prime minister interacts with their psychological predisposition towards debate to encourage groupthink, polythink or a more positive style of ‘vigilant’ decision-making.
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