Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case

Abstract

Walker, S. G. and Watson, G. L. Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIV, 1989, 199-212. We focus in this paper upon the groupthink construct as a partial explanation for the flawed decision-making by British leaders in managing the Munich crisis with Germany. In order to assess its explanatory power, we follow the precedent established in previous case studies, which explore the link between groupthink and the levels of integrative complexity exhibited by decision-makers. The hypothesis linking the two phenomena is that in cases where groupthink is present, the level of integrative complexity will be significantly lower than in cases where it is absent. The Munich case is a particularly appropriate case for replicating the test of this hypothesis because, unlike other groupthink cases, it did not lead to unsuccessful military interventions or escalations. Our results indicate that: (1) groupthink existed in the Munich case; however, it did not persist throughout the entire crisis. (2) Its presence and absence within the crisis fluctuated consistently with the expectations associated with the theory which accounts for its dynamics. (3) The integrative complexity exhibited by Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax varied as predicted by the hypothesis linking it with groupthink.