Abstract
We experimentally investigate the eects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron-Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the eects of group size on delay under both majority and unanimity rule. Under both decision rules, we nd that proposals more often fail in larger groups, leading to increased delay. Consistent with prior research, we also nd that unanimity rule leads to more delay than does majority rule, in both small
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