Group Secret-Key Generation Using Algebraic Rings in Wireless Networks

Abstract

It is well known that physical-layer Group Secret-Key (GSK) generation techniques allow multiple nodes of a wireless network to synthesize a common secret-key, which can be subsequently used to keep their group messages confidential. As one of its salient features, the wireless nodes involved in physical-layer GSK generation extract randomness from a subset of their wireless channels, referred as the common source of randomness (CSR). Unlike two-user key generation, in GSK generation, some nodes must act as facilitators by broadcasting quantized versions of the linear combinations of the channel realizations, so as to assist all the nodes to observe a CSR. However, we note that broadcasting linear combination of channel realizations incurs non-zero leakage of the CSR to an eavesdropper, and moreover, quantizing the linear combination also reduces the overall key-rate. Identifying these issues, we propose a practical GSK generation protocol, referred to as Algebraic Symmetrically Quantized GSK (A-SQGSK) protocol, in a network of three nodes, wherein due to quantization of symbols at the facilitator, the other two nodes also quantize their channel realizations, and use them appropriately over algebraic rings to generate the keys. First, we prove that the A-SQGSK protocol incurs zero leakage to an eavesdropper. Subsequently, on the CSR provided by the A-SQGSK protocol, we propose a consensus algorithm among the three nodes, called the Entropy-Maximization Error-Minimization (EM-EM) algorithm, which maximizes the entropy of the secret-key subject to an upper-bound on the mismatch-rate. We use extensive analysis and simulation results to lay out guidelines to jointly choose the parameters of the A-SQGSK protocol and the EM-EM algorithm.