Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, whereby acoevolutionary rule is introduced that aims to integrate group penalty into the frameworkof evolutionary games. Existing groups are deleted whenever the collective gains of thefocal individuals are less than a deletion threshold value. Meanwhile, newcomers are addedafter each game iteration to maintain the fixed population size. The networking effect isalso studied via four representative interaction networks which are associated with thepopulation structure. We conclude that the cooperation level has a strong dependence onthe deletion threshold, and the suitable value range of the deletion threshold which isassociated with the maximal cooperation frequency has been found. Simulation results alsoshow that optimum values of the deletion threshold can still warrant the mostpotent promotion of cooperation, irrespective of which of the four topologies isapplied.
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