Abstract
Group-level cognitive states are widely observed in human social systems, but their discussion is often ruled out a priori in quantitative approaches. In this paper, we show how reference to the irreducible mental states and psychological dynamics of a group is necessary to make sense of large scale social phenomena. We introduce the problem of mental boundaries by reference to a classic problem in the evolution of cooperation. We then provide an explicit quantitative example drawn from ongoing work on cooperation and conflict among Wikipedia editors. We show the limitations of methodological individualism, and the substantial benefits that come from being able to refer to collective intentions and attributions of cognitive states of the form "what the group believes" and "what the group values".
Highlights
Accounts of the history and structure of human behavior naturally attribute cognitive properties not just to individuals, but to groups
We showed how game-theoretic notions provided us a rigorous framework within which to move from observations of behavior to knowledge about beliefs and other mental states
Our basic model for interaction locates the struggle for sociality on Wikipedia in the extent to which users perceive the problem as a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, as opposed to a mutualistic interaction where the greatest benefits accrue to joint norm-following. This places our account of Wikipedia on the continuum between those who identify the origin of social complexity in altruism and group selection, vs. those who see the burden on the side of cognitive ability (see, e.g., extended discussion in Tomasello (2009); Bowles and Gintis (2011))
Summary
Accounts of the history and structure of human behavior naturally attribute cognitive properties not just to individuals, but to groups. They do so despite strong methodological rules against such talk (Arrow, 1994): fields as varied as political science, history, anthropology and economics make constant reference to the attitudes, expectations, beliefs, and values of groups. Scholars talk about the desires and strategies of a social class (Kołakowski, 2008), the expectations of financial markets (Kirman, 2010), or the attitudes of a nation (Elias, 2000a) It is generally—usually implicitly—understood that talk about group-level mental states is not simple shorthand for talk about the mental states of individuals. In two Appendices, we provide additional detail on our statistical methods, and on an interesting subtlety in the use of reverts to study conflict on Wiki-like systems
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