Abstract
Philosophical reflection on transparency, including group transparency, is beginning to gain steam. This paper contributes to this work by developing a conceptualization of transparency as an intellectual character trait that groups can possess, and by presenting a novel argument for thinking that such transparency should be understood along non-summativist lines. According to the account offered, a group’s being intellectually transparent consists in the group’s tending to attend well to its perspective and to share its perspective faithfully with others in order to promote their epistemic goods. It is argued that this kind of group intellectual transparency, pace summativism, does not always consist merely in group members possessing intellectual transparency. The argument given for this conclusion works differently from existing arguments for non-summativism about group character traits, and it retains persuasive power even if summativist views of most group phenomena, including other group character traits, are correct.
Highlights
The topic of intellectual transparency has received very limited attention from philosophers
Nor is a group’s attentiveness toward and disclosure of these features always secured through group members’ attentiveness toward and disclosure of other features of their individual perspectives. For each of these kinds of features of group perspectives, something more is often required for the group to attend to and disclose these features well to others than for the group members to act in accordance with intellectual transparency
I remarked at the outset of the previous section that in my view the case of group beliefs or acceptances furnishes the weakest example of a case where group member intellectual transparency can fail to secure by itself group intellectual transparency with respect to a particular feature of a group’s perspective
Summary
Synthese (2022) 200:69 research (2021), which has provided the only philosophical analysis of intellectual transparency as a virtue of individual people that I am aware of, and I will draw upon the small but rapidly growing literature on group character traits and the broader, maturing literature on group epistemology. 1 by briefly presenting my account of individual intellectual transparency and explaining how it could be adapted to provide an account of group intellectual transparenfcy. The argument I will provide arguably works even if simple summativist views of other group intellectual phenomena, including other group intellectual character traits, are correct. The argument puts strong pressure on summativism, while identifying some of the distinctive features that may be required for group intellectual transparency beyond the intellectual transparency of individual group members
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