Group Division as a Method for Conflict Management in Multi-Party Negotiations

Abstract

The complexity of multi-party negotiations can be reduced by dividing conflict parties into subgroups. However, compatibility of interests can vary in subgroups. With high compatibility a subgroup agrees on most issues; parts of the conflict are not negotiated. Additionally, trade-offs between issues can lead to subgroup solutions that deviate from the global optimum solution (incongruence vs. congruence). In three studies groups of four parties conducted multi-issue negotiations. Two parallel dyadic discussions took place during phase one followed by a plenary session in phase two. Study 1 manipulated compatibility by different combinations of parties. Compatibility within dyads was either low, medium or high. Contrary to expectations, high compatibility led to highest joint profit and best subjective evaluations. As can be shown in study 2, this effect is due to the highly uniform task structure which offered salient trade-offs. In a modified structure used in study 2 the effect became reversed. Study 3 manipulated congruency by exchanging profit weights within the payoff tables together with compatibility. Low compatibility was superior to no division provided the structure was congruent. In this condition highest joint profit and the most favourable subjective evaluations were obtained. With incongruency no effects could be found.