Grounds of Normativity

Abstract

This chapter provides a critique of the two thoroughgoing constructivist accounts of value and presents an alternative realist account of value that is compatible with theism. It describes Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian and Street’s Humean versions of constructivism, in turn, outlining the main features of each account. The chapter discusses some possible objections to their accounts of normativity. It also provides a realist framework of value as an alternative for explaining how to ground the normativity of evaluative judgments. Korsgaard believes that the problem of normativity is rooted in our rational nature, specifically in the reflective structure of human consciousness. The problem of normativity comes from the need for reflective endorsement. The chapter explains how such a framework could be best understood by theists who believe that there is a place for the divine will in morality. It explores that there are at least two ways of grounding the normativity of evaluative judgments: an axiological grounding and a theological grounding.